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Incivility in Interactions with Candidates on Twitter 1 
Trolling Alone? Incivility in Interactions with 
Candidates on Twitter in the 2014 European 
Elections  
 
Abstract  
Existing studies focusing on politicians’ adoption of Twitter have found that they use it primarily 
as a broadcasting tool. We argue that citizens’ impolite and/or uncivil behaviour is one possible 
explanation for such decisions. Social media conversations are rife with harassment and politicians 
are a prime target. This alters the incentive structure of engaging in dialogue on social media. We 
use Spanish, Greek, German and UK candidates’ tweets sent during the run-up to the recent 
European Parliament (EP) elections, and rely on automated text analysis and machine learning 
methods to measure their level of civility. Our contribution is an actor-oriented theory of political 
dialogue that incorporates Twitter’s specific affordances, clarifying how and why Twitter’s 
democratic promise may be limited.  
Keywords: political communication, machine learning, social media, Twitter, civility, politeness, 
automated text analysis  
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Trolling Alone? Incivility in Interactions with Candidates on Twitter in the 2014 European 
Parliament Elections 
 
Over the past decade, social media have been integrated and widely used by politicians worldwide 
(Williams and Gulati, 2010; Grant et al., 2010). The ease of adoption, the capacity to bypass the 
mainstream media and create a personal publicity channel, and the limitless opportunities for 
personalised communication, have made them important campaign tools that candidates can use as 
a permanent form of communicating with the electorate (Larsson, 2015; Lee and Oh, 2012; 
Williams and Gulati, 2010; Grant et al., 2010). Twitter, perhaps the most widely adopted platform 
by politicians and one with the capacity to enable a more direct and interactive engagement with 
the public, was supposed to open the door for more citizen voice and participation in the political 
process via different means, counteracting one of the main inhibitors of political involvement – the 
fact that “nobody asks” (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  
Despite this promise, neither the adoption, nor the use of Twitter by politicians managed to live up 
to these normative expectations. Even though this is often seen as a supply-side problem, attributed 
to politicians’ tendency to not take advantage of the platform’s interactive opportunities and their 
persistence on using the platform in a broadcasting style (Grant et al., 2010; Graham et al., 2013), 
fewer explanations have taken into consideration the interaction between the supply and demand 
side, as well as the platform’s own limitations and "dark sides".  
In this paper we address the question of why politicians may be using the platform in ways 
seemingly inconsistent with the promotion of democratic deliberation. But rather than focusing on 
the supply side only, we take advantage of the unique asymmetrical relationship structure of 
Twitter and advance existing literature by proposing an explanation that lies in the interaction 
between the supply and demand sides. Specifically, taking into consideration that information and 
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communication technologies have built-in features and affordances that can both enable and 
constrain social relationships (Latour, 2005), we investigate the possibility that the demand side, 
i.e. the users, bolstered by Twitter’s wall of anonymity and the platform’s weak capacity to deal 
with harassment and trolling (Hern, 2015), may also be falling short of their responsibilities as 
counterparts in political discourse. We argue that not only the style of a candidate’s engagement 
with their followers, but also their decision to interact with someone in a public space is subject to 
decisions and trade-offs involving whether some sort of civilised and constructive dialogue can 
take place.  
Although most of online interactions are civilised, online spaces are rife with incivility and abuse 
(Mason, 2016). While extreme cases of uncivil behavior have often led to penalties and even 
imprisonment of political Twitter trolls (BBC, 2014), most of everyday trolling is probably 
considered unavoidable. However, this by no means indicates that the presence of such responses 
to candidates’ tweets should not alter how they approach their social media communication. 
Politeness and civility are fundamental requirements for democratic discourse (Mutz and Reeves, 
2005; Papacharissi, 2004) and the anonymity behind which many users choose to hide themselves 
allows for limitless abuse (Cheng et al., 2015; Davis, 2009), which can ultimately influence the 
motivations behind the communication style of candidates.  
We empirically test this argument with data from the Twitter communication of Spanish, British, 
Greek and German candidates who ran for a seat during the 2014 European Parliament (EP) 
election. Our analysis provides evidence of a positive relationship between candidates’ engagement 
on Twitter and exposure to attacks and harassment from citizens. Our theoretical contribution is 
twofold. We extend prior research by shifting attention to potential disincentives grounded in the 
behavior of the public that ultimately influences how candidates make use of Twitter. In this sense, 
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we explain why the use of social media might not be able to live up to its own promise for politics. 
Second, we show that this explanation fits within an actor-oriented approach of the use of social 
media in politics, but emphasize systematic differences contingent on candidate characteristics. By 
revealing the trade-offs that candidates for office face when articulating their communication 
strategies on social media, our study yields important insights about how the use of these platforms 
may affect the quality of public discourse and voters’ knowledge of their options in the voting 
booth.  
Candidates on Social Media: Engaging vs. Broadcasting Communication 
Social networking sites and microblogging platforms have been put to use as everyday channels 
for reaching the public, and have been strategically embedded in local, national and supranational 
electoral campaigns (Gibson, 2013; Gulati and Williams, 2013; Koc-Michalska et al., 2014; 
Vergeer and Hermans, 2013; Vergeer et al., 2011b; Nulty et al., 2016). The sharp rise in social 
media adoption by candidates stems from the quick realisation that there are significant benefits in 
adopting these tools for enriching traditional political communication practices and enhancing the 
much-strained relationship with voters (Wattenberg, 2002). It has also given the opportunity to 
candidates in party-centered systems to engage in personal promotion outside the auspices of their 
parties (Larsson and Moe, 2011; Karlsen and Skogerbø, 2015).  
Much of the recent literature on the political properties of social media has focused on social media 
platforms’ different "affordances" (Earl and Kimport, 2011): for example, contrary to Facebook, 
Twitter is particularly suitable for an active, engaged style of messaging a candidate’s followers 
due to the embedded asymmetrical structure of relationships that allows for direct interaction 
between unknown people (Grant et al., 2010). This makes Twitter of particular interest as it cannot 
only facilitate genuine engagement from the public but it can also have important benefits for 
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candidates. Lee and Oh (2012), for example, argue that directly addressing followers on Twitter 
can stimulate feelings similar to those of face-to-face communication, overcoming the 
depersonalising effects of digital communication and enhancing one’s feelings of presence, 
ultimately increasing emotional closeness felt towards the candidate and eliciting positive 
evaluations (Lee and Shin, 2016). In the same vein, Veenstra and Lyons (2016, p.13) found that 
compared to an unengaging, broadcast-focused politician, one who includes conversational cues is 
likely to be viewed more positively overall. Despite these advantages over other platforms, 
empirical evidence, with few exceptions (Enli and Skogerbø, 2013), shows that Twitter is scarcely 
ever used in an interactive way by politicians (Golbeck et al., 2010; Glassman et al., 2010; Graham 
et al., 2013; Grant et al., 2010; Golbeck et al., 2010; Larsson and Moe, 2011; Small, 2011). 
Although much research has focused on factors explaining the presence or frequency of policy 
elites’ activity on social media (see Obholzer and Daniel, 2016; Nulty et al., 2016; van Dalen et al, 
2015 for recent examples), less attention has been paid on what may be explaining candidates’ style 
of use. 
Incentive Structure of Adopting an Engaging Communication Style on Twitter 
A crucial first step for understanding why candidates may not engage in dialogue with users on 
Twitter is to examine motivations for using Twitter that, despite not requiring interaction, can 
nevertheless offer them concrete benefits. Our overall approach can be situated within Benoit’s 
functional theory of political discourse and Stromer-Galley’s controlled interactivity thesis, both 
of which posit that candidates’ communication and messaging tactics are predominantly aimed at 
achieving one goal: winning the election (Benoit, 2007, p. 32; Stromer-Galley, 2014, p. 2). 
Building on this research, as well as on the conceptualization of Enli and Skogerbø, we posit that 
in an actor (candidate) oriented framework, there are three clear, universal motives for investing 
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resources – in this context referring to personal time and money – on social media: marketing, 
mobilisation and dialogue (Enli and Skogerbø, 2013, p.763).  
Marketing reflects the most obvious benefit as it allows for increased visibility (Lassen and Brown, 
2011; Veenstra and Lyons, 2016) and provides ample opportunities for political message 
personalisation (Enli and Skogerbø, 2013). Maintaining a Twitter profile leads to greater reach and 
thus expands candidates’ visibility during, but also outside, electoral campaigns. It functions not 
only as a personal publicity channel, allowing candidates to distinguish themselves from other 
candidates without depending on the news media (Benoit, 2007, p.35), but also as a method of 
rapidly reacting to critical ongoing political developments, communicating with the press, and 
responding to the spread of questionable information or personal attacks without being limited by 
gatekeepers. At the same time, Twitter affords candidates the opportunity to post messages in 
frames that they (or their consultants) think that present them in a positive light to their followers 
(Veenstra and Lyons, 2016), and allows them to present the content in a personal and direct way.  
Consequently, Twitter represents an incredibly powerful tool for building a public image and for 
revealing a public side as well. Twitter has been considered the quintessential social media platform 
for mobilising citizens for protest events (Lotan et al., 2011; González-Bailón et al., 2011; Barberá 
et al., 2015b; Theocharis et al., 2015), but is also ideally suited for voter mobilization. It allows the 
fast diffusion of speech announcements, invitations to campaign events, donation requests and 
volunteering requests at a very low cost (Williams and Gulati, 2010), with some studies suggesting 
that more intensive online activity even pays off at the polls, at least in the context of EP elections1 
(Vergeer et al., 2011a).  
With positive outcomes for both candidates and democracy, marketing and mobilisation are already 
two strongly and sufficiently beneficial incentives for using Twitter. Most importantly, both yield 
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benefits without necessitating the adoption of an engaging style of communication with the 
citizens. A baseline hypothesis thus is:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Politicians make broadcasting rather than engaging use of Twitter  
Despite the clear benefits of broadcasting use, however, engaging in dialogue with citizens has 
consistently been the most desirable and revolutionary, from a normative point of view, aspect of 
the internet; one thought of as being able to benefit both the politician and, most crucially, 
democracy (Rheingold, 1993; Barber, 2004; Etzioni, 1993; Stromer-Galley, 2014). Perhaps the 
most well-documented cause for citizens’ disconnection from politics is that they feel that they 
have no say in what government does and no influence in political affairs, primarily because there 
is little public dialogue and discussion with politicians, and because politicians do not listen to 
them (Henn et al., 2002; Coleman & Blumler, 2009; Hay, 2008; Stoker, 2009). The possibility of 
two-way interaction between citizens and political actors is, thus, seen as a major step towards re-
establishing democratic accountability and facilitating public participation.  
Two-way interaction on social media can thus not only reinvigorate democracy but can provide 
direct input from voters and improve political communication. Direct communication with the 
voters can play a significant role in repairing the damaged relationships between voters and 
politicians in general, in reinstating some level of trust through greater intimacy, and in facilitating 
the emergence of a democratic online public sphere by opening up a new avenue for citizen voice 
and deliberation. Importantly, and beyond the theoretical and normative benefits, empirical 
evidence shows that there are real gains in adopting an engaging (as opposed to broadcasting) style 
of Twitter – both for the candidate who makes the extra effort to engage the public, and for 
democracy in general (Lee and Shin, 2012; Lee and Oh, 2012; Veenstra and Lyons, 2016). Why, 
then, do candidates continue to use Twitter in a one-directional manner?  
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(Im)politeness and (In)civility as an Inhibitor of Engaging Use of Twitter 
We argue that part of the explanation lies in the incentive structure and relates to trade-offs, risks 
and responsibility on the part of the candidate. Engaging citizens online has long been considered 
a risky business for politicians, and it has been supported that political campaigns do not use digital 
media to genuinely engage citizens and supporters but merely to create a “spectacle of interactivity” 
(Stromer-Galley, 2014, p.5). Early research has showed that the reasons why politicians were 
hesitant to use the interactive features of their websites lay not only in strenuous work schedules 
and limited time (Coleman and Blumler, 2009) but also out of fear of losing control over the content 
and due to concerns of losing intentional ambiguity over policy positions by having to specify 
claims or policy positions (Stromer-Galley, 2000). Yet this risk is substantially reduced on Twitter. 
The platform’s word limit allows for greater control of the content (than e.g. blogs, websites or 
even Facebook) and this laconicism is ideal for strategic ambiguity. These properties counteract 
two of the major inhibitors for directly engaging with the public – loss of control and ambiguity of 
campaign communication (Stromer-Galley, 2000. However, dialogue does come with 
responsibility. If one decides to engage, one must be prepared to follow-up(i.e. engage with 
multiple members of the public). This, due to the higher resources required may, unless there are 
clear gains, bring dialogue to the bottom of the incentive list.  
We suggest that, in the outlined incentive structure, engaging in dialogue on Twitter comes at the 
bottom of a candidate’s list because much of the content addressed to them is democratically 
damaging, or undermines fundamental discussion norms. Despite the high level of control that 
Twitter messages enable, especially prominent politicians are often victims of abuse, with heavy 
insults directed at them seconds after they post2. Extant psychological research on the side-effects 
of anonymous computer-mediated communication shows that sometimes communicators tend to 
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be more susceptible to group influence, social attraction, stereotyping, gender typing, and 
discrimination (Postmes et al., 1998, Postmes et al., 2001). At the same time, due to the internet’s 
affordances, “harassers can take advantage of being unidentifiable, anonymous, and invisible, in 
addition to having immediate, easy-to-execute, almost untraceable escape route mechanisms” 
(Barak, 2005. p. 83). This implies that trolling in an environment such as Twitter is not only a very 
low-cost, but also a low-risk activity. Thus, the more a candidate attempts to engage, the more 
material will provide to potential trolls.       
Previous research has found that impolite and uncivil, discourse can have a widespread poisonous 
and polarizing effect on discussions (Anderson et al., 2013, Veenstra and Lyons, 2016). To our 
knowledge, there is no study examining how candidates or political actors in general, react to 
impolite and uncivil language. Although most existing research on incivility3 focuses mainly on 
candidates’ attacks on one another (Mutz and Reeves, 2005; Mutz, 2015; Brooks and Geer, 2007), 
in this study we argue that much of the content that is addressed to politicians on Twitter also goes 
far beyond robust discussion (Bartlett, 2015), being, at best, impolite and, at worst, uncivil. 
Impoliteness and incivility tend to be conflated due to their conceptual resemblance (Papacharissi, 
2004, p.260). Specifically, even though for some scholars uncivil discourse is defined by 
“communication that violates the norms of politeness for a given culture” (Mutz, 2015, p. 6), we 
agree with Papacharissi that to capture incivility one needs to move beyond rudeness and poor 
manners. We thus provide a more fine-grained measure of incivility that involves impolite 
behaviour with direct democratic consequences, such as when people offend individuals or social 
groups by denying their personal freedoms and stereotyping them. This implies that we conduct a 
stricter test for incivility than previous studies. Based on these theoretical considerations, from a 
democratic point of view, engaging use of Twitter, which mainly involves dialogue with citizens, 
should be prioritised over broadcasting use that involves mobilisation and marketing. As from the 
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candidate’s point of view conflict aversion should be prioritised, the above incentive structure 
changes so as to reflect a style of tweeting which leaves the candidate less exposed to risk, with 
less responsibilities and, at the same time, with as great a benefit as possible.  
Against this background, it is reasonable to assume that there will be variation when it comes to 
broadcasting and engaging use of the platform by, say, a high-ranked candidate from a resourceful 
party who has strong presence in the media as well as dedicated staff, and young and upcoming 
candidates who are in a greater need to attract voters and thus have higher incentives to use the 
platform for engaging the public. Following this rationale, we formulate the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Engaging style of tweeting is positively related to impolite or uncivil responses  
Data Collection and Case Selection 
The data used in this paper was collected as part of the European Election Study 2014, Social Media 
Study. The study identified and collected the candidates list of all major parties competing in the 
2014 EP election. Afterwards, starting from January 2014, the study created a list with all the 
Twitter handles and Facebook user names for candidates who were active on social media. This 
list was updated right before the election in May 2014. All in all, we found that across the entire 
space of the European Union a total of 2,482 out of 15,527 identified MEP candidates (16%) had 
a presence on Twitter (for a more detailed discussion see Nulty et al, 2016 and Supplementary 
Material C).  
Using the Twitter firehose, we collected all the social media communication centered around the 
candidates resulting in a dataset containing every tweet, retweet, and response of a candidate as 
well as all the responses to these tweets. Furthermore, we also collected all the tweets that 
mentioned the candidates in any form. The data collection procedure lasted for 4 weeks from the 
Incivility in Interactions with Candidates on Twitter 11 
5th of May 2014 until June 1st 2014, covering the last 3 weeks of the electoral campaign and the 
week following the elections. The final outcome is a database of approximately four million tweets 
that we believe accurately depicts the Twitter communication in the 2014 EP election.  
[Table 1 about here] 
For the specific purpose of this paper we choose to concentrate only on four countries: Spain, 
Germany, UK, and Greece. These were chosen based on the degree of support for the EU
 
and 
whether or not the countries received financial aid during the public debt crisis in the Eurozone, 
while also taking into account the use of Twitter during the campaign 2014 EP Election campaign 
(see more details in Supplementary Material X). As incivility is related more to contextual than to 
habitual factors (Herbst, 2010), our general expectation is that the level of politeness and civility 
would vary depending on these two contextual factors. To be more specific, in the online 
environment “weightier” frames are prone to generate a higher percentage of uncivil responses 
(Coe et al., 2014). Thus, the interplay of strong anti-EU feelings and severe economic conditions 
(i.e. receiving substantial financial international support) is expected to add more “weight” and 
also increase the level of conflict (i.e more polarization) around the EP elections (Popa et al., 2016; 
Hobolt and de Vries, 2015, 2016), resulting in a more frequent use of impolite and uncivil language 
in the social media communication around the EP elections. In Table 1 we provide a summary of 
our dataset used for our analyses with Twitter communication during the 2014 EP elections in all 
4 countries included in this study.9 
Automatic Classification of Social Media Posts 
Generating a Labeled Dataset  
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In order to test our hypotheses, it was necessary to classify tweets along various different 
dimensions of interest, such as their level of politeness, or how engaging they are. We achieved 
this goal by selecting for labeling a random sample of 7,000 tweets in each country, which we then 
used to train a machine learning classifier that predicts the category to which all tweets in our 
dataset correspond. The coding scheme used in the labeling process was developed by the authors 
and contains the following three categories related to the tweet content:  
1. Communication style is the dependent variable of this study and differentiates between 
broadcasting tweets (i.e. tweets that simply depict statement or an expression of opinion) 
and engaging tweets (i.e. tweets that are directed to someone else/another user or are a 
direct response to a previous tweet).   
2. Polite vs impolite distinguishes between tweets that are written in a well-mannered and non- 
offensive way vs. tweets that are ill-mannered, disrespectful or contain offensive language.  
3. Morality/Democracy refers to whether the tweet contains a reference to moral and/or 
democracy issues, which are roughly covered by the Freedom and Democracy Domain and 
the Social Fabric Domain present in the European Parliament Election Study 1979-2009, 
Manifesto Study (Braun et al., 2015).  
In addition, we also constructed a measure of incivility for each tweet combining the information 
in these two last categories. We consider incivility as a subcategory of impolite tweets that also 
refer to moral issues or democracy (e.g. tweets that make reference to one of the following topics: 
freedom and human rights, traditional morality, law and order, social harmony, freedom and human 
rights, democracy, constitutionalism). The basic assumption that guides our operationalization is 
that impolite remarks with direct democratic consequences constitute an uncivil tweet. To be more 
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specific, by making impolite remarks such tweets stereotype and offend individuals/social groups 
and/or challenge their freedoms/rights, disrespecting thus collective democratic traditions. Further 
details of the coding scheme and examples for each category can be found in the supplementary 
material A.  
The overall results of the coding process, including estimates of intercoder reliability and summary 
statistics for these variables are in the Supplementary Material B. We obtain above 80% coder 
agreement across the board despite the unbalanced distribution in terms of tone and content, 
resulting in lower reliability scores. Finally, we also emphasize that these results should not be 
considered as measures of reliability in the traditional sense (for concept measurement), as the 
classification stage incorporates any disagreement at the human coding level into the estimation. 
The data resulted from the coding procedure is supplemented by a number of other variables that 
will mainly serve as control in our analyses. These refer to both candidate (i.e. gender, incumbency 
status in the EP, electoral viability11, estimated ideological position) and party features (size of 
party, incumbency status, placement on left-right and pro-anti EU dimension). 
Training Machine Learning Classifiers  
Using the dataset of labeled tweets from each country, we then constructed machine learning 
classifiers that allow us to estimate the probability that each individual tweet in each country in our 
dataset corresponds to one of the three categories of interest. Our analysis is divided in three steps: 
text preprocessing, training and validation of the classifiers, and application to our entire corpus 
(see Hastie et al., 2009 for a more technical description of this method, and Barberá et al (2016) 
for an application to media texts). As we describe in Supplementary Material B, in most cases we 
find levels of accuracy (percentage of tweets correctly predicted by our classifier) that outperforms 
the benchmark of just choosing the modal category for each variable.14 The performance of this 
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method is similar in magnitude to the intercoder reliability among the coders of the labeled set, 
which suggests that our classifier is able to approximate the quality of human coding.15 
 [ Figure 1 about here] 
As additional validation for the outcome of our automated classification method, we also examined 
that the terms that the model identifies as being most associated with each category indeed 
correspond to our expectations. As an example, we found that the classifier predicts as engaging 
those tweets that indicate direct communication (e.g. an @ sign followed by what could be the 
beginning of a message, such as “thank you” or “hi”), as impolite those tweets that contain insults 
and expletives, and as mentioning moral and democracy issues those tweets with words such as 
“freedom”, “democracy”, “peace” or “rights”. We also validated that our estimate of a given tweet 
being engaging is accurate by relying on our behavioral expectations. In particular, we tested 
whether tweets sent by candidates with a higher probability of being classified as engaging are 
receiving more responses by ordinary citizens, under the assumption that a good measure of 
whether candidates are reaching to voters is observing that voters are indeed reacting to that 
message. Figure 1 displays the results of this validation exercise. Here, we use a Poisson model 
where we regress the number of responses to each tweet on the predicted probability of that same 
tweet being considered engaging, and display the predicted number of responses and a 95% 
confidence interval. The results confirm our expectation and strengthen our claim that the 
automated classification method we employ is accurately measuring our dimensions of interest.  
The final step in our analysis is to predict the labels for all the tweets in our dataset. To do so, we 
apply the same text-preprocessing procedure to the text of the tweets, construct the feature matrix, 
and compute the predicted probability that each tweet corresponds to one category or the other. 
Finally, we aggregate these probabilities at the candidate level, both for the tweets that he or she 
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sent, and for the tweets that he or she received (that contained a mention to twitter handle).  
Analysis  
In order to test our two hypotheses, we conduct two separate sets of analyses. First, we use the 
dataset described in the previous section to test if it is indeed the case that most candidates use 
Twitter as a tool to broadcast content, as our first hypothesis states. Second, we examine if part of 
the variation in candidates’ willingness to engage with citizens on social media is related to their 
exposure to impolite tweets, our main independent variable. To test whether there is a positive 
relationship between these two variables, we estimate three complementary regression models, 
each of them using data at a different level of aggregation: across candidates, within candidates 
and over time, and across individual tweets. First, we aggregate all tweets at the candidate level 
and use multivariate linear regressions to demonstrate that candidates who send more engaging 
tweets are also more likely to receive more impolite responses, holding all else constant. Second, 
we adopt a dynamic perspective to provide evidence that candidates who send more engaging 
tweets in a given week are more likely to be exposed to more impolite responses the following 
week. Finally, we focus on individual tweets and rely on multilevel regression models that reveal 
that tweets that are classified as engaging also tend to receive more impolite responses.  
Results  
Do Politicians Make Broadcasting or Engaging use of Twitter? 
Table 1 lists the means of our main dependent and independent variables (with distribution figure 
in Supplementary Material D). We find substantive variation in our variables of interest both across 
and within countries. Candidates in the United Kingdom and Spain tend to send more tweets that 
are directed to the users, although still a large proportion of tweets in these countries are classified 
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as broadcasting (47% and 55%, respectively), which provides support for our first hypothesis. 
Greece and Germany lie at the other extreme of this distribution – here, for most candidates less 
than 25% of their tweets engage with citizens in any way, and the total of broadcasting tweets is 
81% and 74%, respectively. The variation within countries also appears to correspond to our 
expectations: candidates that belong to the Pirate Party in the UK, Spain, and Germany are clear 
positive outliers, with the highest average proportion of engaging tweets (68%, 61%, and 58%, 
respectively).  
We also find variation across countries and within countries in our second variable of interest.17 
Greece is by far the country with most impolite tweets: on average, 18% of all tweets mentioning 
a candidate were classified as impolite (vs 6% in Germany, 4% in Spain, and 5% in the UK). An 
examination of some of the outliers within each country corresponds to our expectations: e.g. 10% 
of tweets mentioning UKIP’s Nigel Farage were impolite, and 20% of tweets mentioning German 
extreme right-wing activist Ricarda Riefling were impolite. As we show in Supplementary Material 
D, these differences are stable over the campaign. 
Do Engaging Tweets Receive More Impolite and Uncivil Responses?  
Table 2 shows the results of our first approach to testing our second hypothesis: a set of multivariate 
linear regressions of the proportion of engaging tweets sent by each candidate on the proportion of 
impolite tweets they receive,18
 
weighing our observations by the number of tweets sent by each of 
them.19
 
We find clear support for our hypothesis. In the first two models, where we add country 
fixed effects and our main set of control variables, we find a positive partial correlation between 
engaging tweets sent and impolite tweets received: the model predicts that an increase of 25 
percentage points in engaging tweets sent (which is similar to a change from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile in this variable) is associated with an increase in impolite tweets received of 0.76 
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percentage points, which corresponds to around 12% of the std. deviation in this variable. In other 
words, the results suggest that candidates who try to engage in conversations with voters receive 
more vitriol.  
[Table 5 about here] 
This result is robust to the inclusion of other potential covariates that might explain the relationship 
between these two variables, such as the number of followers, the vote share for the party they 
belong to, and their expected success according to their position on the party list. Although we did 
not have specific hypotheses regarding the effect of these covariates, the results are consistent with 
conventional wisdom: candidates from small parties and with few followers, as well as female 
candidates, appear to receive more impolite responses, even though these two last effects are not 
statistically significant. However, Model 3 shows that the magnitude of the estimated effect 
decreases when we control for the position on the left-right and European integration dimensions, 
which we measured by scaling the follower networks of the MEP candidates and the national MPs 
in each country.20 We find that right-wing and pro-Europe candidates are more likely to receive 
impolite tweets.  
In Model 4 we explore country-level heterogeneity by interacting our main independent variable 
with the country dummies. After computing the marginal effects of the number of engaging tweets 
sent, we find that the estimate has the expected sign in the UK (0.06, p = 0.28), Spain (0.02, p = 
0.32), and Greece (0.06, p < 0.01), but not in Germany (-0.005, p = 0.36), and it is only significant 
in the Greek case. However, part of this pattern could be due to not having enough sample size to 
properly estimate country-level differences. Finally, we also try to disentangle the effects of 
impoliteness vs civility by replicating our analysis using as dependent variable a measure of the 
proportion of uncivil tweets received by candidates. In particular, this variable is the product of the 
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proportion of impolite tweets received by the proportion of tweets received that mention morality 
or democracy issues. As we discuss earlier in the paper, we consider incivility as impolite behavior 
with direct democratic consequences, because it features attacks on social groups and their rights. 
Here, we still find a statistically significant effect of engaging tweets sent on uncivil tweets 
received, and of similar relative magnitude: an increase from the 25th to the 75th percentiles in the 
independent variable is associated with an increase in uncivil tweets received of 0.11 percentage 
points (around 15% of the standard deviation in this variable).21 
One of the limitations of our analysis is the possibility that candidate-specific characteristics such 
as their ideological positions explain both how often they engage with citizens on Twitter and the 
type of response they receive. To overcome this limitation, we now turn to a time-series analysis 
of how candidates’ tweeting behavior changed during the campaign. We split the tweets sent by 
each candidate and the tweets mentioning each candidate by week, into three groups: tweets sent 
in the third week before the election, the second week before the election, and the week before.22
 
For each of these weeks, we then compute again the average probability that tweets by the candidate 
are classified as engaging, and also that tweets mentioning the candidate are impolite, which results 
in a panel dataset where the unit of analysis is candidate × week.23
 
 
Using this new dataset, we examine the relationship between candidates’ communication style on 
Twitter and their exposure to impolite messages by estimating a bivariate linear regression with 
candidate fixed effects. Since our comparison is now within candidates, it is not necessary to 
control for other variables in the previous analyses, which remain constant. More specifically, we 
regress the change in the proportion of impolite tweets received on the lagged proportion of 
engaging tweets sent by that candidate. This allows us to observe whether candidates who interact 
with their followers more often are more likely to increase the levels of harassment they are 
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exposed to as a result, during the following week. Table 6 displays the results of this analysis, first 
pooling all data together and then for each of the four countries we consider. We find strong support 
for our hypothesis in the pooled model: candidates who are more engaging in their communication 
style tend to receive more impolite tweets as the campaign progresses. In particular, we estimate 
that a one-standard-deviation positive change in the proportion of engaging tweets (around 19 
percentage points) increases impolite tweets received by 5.2 percentage points (around 73% of the 
standard deviation in this variable). As it was the case before, when we disaggregate by country 
we find coefficients in the expected direction, but generally not reaching conventional levels of 
statistical significance.  
[Table 6 about here] 
We turn to our third type of analysis, where we offer a more fine-grained examination of how 
individuals react to candidates by taking tweets as our unit of analysis. We consider only those 
tweets sent by candidates (134,330 during our period of analysis), and look up in our full dataset 
any tweet by citizens that was a direct response to each of these tweets.24 We then aggregate the 
predicted probability of each response being classified as impolite to compute a measure of the 
level of negativity that candidates are exposed to, after they post each individual tweet.  
Figure 4 provides a first look at the relationship between these two variables at the tweet level. 
Here, we display the predicted impoliteness in responses to candidate tweets, as a function of how 
engaging they are estimated to be, in a linear regression fitted separately for each country. In all 
cases we find strong, significant evidence that candidates’ efforts to reach directly to voters tend to 
generate higher levels of impoliteness in citizens’ responses.  
[Figure 4 about here]  
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Part of this relationship could be due to candidate- or country-specific characteristics. In order to 
show that this result is robust to controlling for some of these other covariates, we now offer 
estimates from multilevel regression models with varying slopes where our key covariate is the 
probability that each tweet by the candidate is classified as engaging. This approach allows us to 
model the structure of the data (tweets nested within candidates) and is flexible enough to estimate 
whether the effect of engagement on impoliteness varies across candidates. 
Table 7 displays the results of this analysis, which confirms our result that tweets that are classified 
as being engaging receive many more impolite responses. In particular, according to the results in 
Model 2, we find that an increase in the probability of a candidate tweet being engaging from 0.17 
to 0.78 (25th and 75th percentiles in this variable, respectively) increases the average impoliteness 
in the responses to that tweet in 14 percentage points, which is equivalent to slightly over 3 standard 
deviations in this variable. As in the previous analyses, we find some heterogeneity across 
countries, but in this case we find positive and statistically significant effects in all cases. In 
particular, the estimated marginal effects are: 0.017 (p < 0.01) in Germany, 0.019 (p < 0.01) in 
Greece, 0.005 (p < 0.01) in Spain, and 0.011 (p < 0.01) in the UK.  
[Table 7 about here] 
Discussion 
Social media have become an important platform for electoral campaigning. Twitter in particular, 
due to its asymmetrical structure, is an important campaigning tool for candidates. Not only is it an 
efficient tool for a politician’s image promotion and policy position distribution, it also offers a 
platform for voter mobilization and provides a space on which candidates can present a more 
personal side, reducing the emotional distance with citizens. Most importantly, from a democratic 
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point of view, Twitter provides an incredible opportunity for interactive communication between 
candidates and citizens. On Twitter, candidates can listen to citizens’ feedback directly, while they 
also have the opportunity to respond using a platform whose laconic conversational structure 
allows for short and concise messages that enable strategic ambiguity and reduce the danger of loss 
of content control. Interactive use has been shown to have benefits for both sides, with politicians 
standing to especially benefit by being generally seen more positively when they interact with the 
public than when they don’t.  
Despite these important advantages for the politician at a personal level and for democracy in 
general, previous research has shown clearly that politicians, even when generally active on the 
platform, choose to make broadcasting, rather than interactive use. We have confirmed this pattern 
in this paper as well. Extant literature has offered little insight as to why this may be the case on 
Twitter - a platform whose affordances shield candidates from many of the potential dangers 
highlighted in the literature (Stromer-Galley, 2000).  
Here we have argued that, in the design of communication strategies on social media platforms, 
candidates face an important trade-off between what is normatively desirable and what can be 
advantageous during an election campaign. On the one hand, using social media websites like 
Twitter or Facebook to connect with the electorate and establish a constructive dialogue with them 
is normatively desirable, and at least a priori also what voters prefer. On the other, this type of 
behavior implies giving up some communication control in order to reap the interactive benefits of 
social media, and is thus risky: it can attract the vitriol of citizens who, protected by the apparent 
anonymity of the platform, harass or attack the candidate, downgrading the quality of the debate 
and discouraging others from participating while potentially also destroying the candidate’s 
reputation. From this perspective, although as our study shows the majority of tweets addressed to 
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candidates do not include harassment, perhaps a strategy of just using social media as a one-way 
communication device, useful to bypass traditional media outlets and reach directly the electorate 
could actually improve candidates’ electoral performance.  
In this paper, we have provided evidence of the existence of this trade-off. Relying on a large 
dataset of social media posts related to the elections to the European Parliament in four different 
countries, and exploiting recent advances in automated classification of text, we have been able to 
measure the extent to which candidates engage in conversations with citizens, and also their levels 
of exposure to impolite and uncivil messages. Our results support the hypothesis that these two 
types of behavior are positively related: candidates with more engaging messages are also more 
exposed to criticism and harassment. This finding has important ramifications for political 
communication research, especially normative accounts about the benefits of two-way interaction, 
at least as far as Twitter is concerned. Placing less emphasis on what can be called misaffordances 
of social media, extant literature has generally assumed that (a) the two-way interaction enabled by 
platforms such as Twitter will be crucial for democratic reinvigoration, that (b) if citizens are given 
the opportunity to engage they will do so conforming to generally accepted standards of politeness, 
and that (c) candidates’ efforts to reach the public are, more often than not, insufficient. Our study 
shows that, often, the opposite is true as the deliberative democratic potential offered by the 
platform’s own affordances may be inhibited not because of the potential lack of willingness on 
the part of candidates, but because of the ways citizens often tend to behave in largely anonymous 
online contexts, and because of the constraints imposed (or at least not prevented) by the platforms 
themselves. These insights call for more research on the misaffordances of new digital tools, as 
well as on how to integrate the kind of citizen behaviours they give rise to – and their consequences, 
within our broader understanding of political and campaign communication dynamics. 
Importantly, moving the focus away from the well-studied phenomenon of incivility among 
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politicians, our findings urge that more attention in political communication research should be 
paid to the demand-side and the consequences of direct interactions between citizens and 
politicians.    
Our analysis also illustrates the large potential of automated text analysis techniques applied to the 
study of social media platforms. Although the iterative process to develop a codebook and train 
coders required a significant effort, the data generated proved to be useful in training supervised 
learning algorithms that allowed us to code the content of hundreds of thousands of tweets with 
accuracy that matches human coding. In combination with recent development in crowdsourcing 
techniques (Benoit et al., 2015), we believe our approach will enable researchers to answer standing 
questions in the study of political communication that up to now required an extensive and 
expensive coding process. However, our analysis is not without shortcomings.  
First, we are not able to establish whether these relationships are causal. We cannot distinguish 
whether candidates who send more engaging tweets attract more “trolls”, or whether they send this 
type of messages more often precisely because they are responding to such attacks. Our analysis 
of how candidates’ behavior evolves during the campaign partially addresses this concern, although 
an experimental setup would be more useful. Second, although we have tried to make a distinction 
between impoliteness and incivility, in our analysis we did not find any meaningful differences in 
their effects on candidates’ behavior. However, this could be due to the difficulty of distinguishing 
these two dimensions empirically, and not necessarily because they have identical effects. Finally, 
given the party-centered electoral system of the EP elections, we were not able to examine the 
effect of different campaign strategies at the candidate level of their subsequent electoral success, 
which is clearly a missing piece in the puzzle of why candidates may decide to make only 
broadcasting use of social media platforms. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 In terms of party and candidate related differences, smaller or opposition parties have been found 
to be both early adopters and heavier users of the platform (Vergeer et al., 2011a) while, on average, 
in Europe younger and incumbent candidates report more activity on the platform (Lorenzo-
Rodríguez and Garmendia Madariaga, 2016).  
2 Impolite remarks are presumably not always perceived as discouraging (see an overview of this 
argument in Papacharissi, 2004, p.262).  
3 For a more complete overview of the effects of incivility on political discussions see Appendix. 
4 Previous studies have shown that this is the case in other online platforms too. Davis (2009) 
argued that mockery and derogatory comments are so common on political blogs, that incivility is 
almost the default condition in such discussion forums – also Sobieraj and Berry, 2011).  
9 Following a re-checking and validation of the completeness of our sample candidates in May 
2015 we can estimate that our data covers: 86% of the Greek candidates, 89% of the UK candidates, 
78% of the German candidates and 85% of the Spanish candidates. This re-enforces our belief that 
the data used in this study offers a very accurate coverage of the social media communication via 
Twitter at the time of the 2014 EP Elections.  
11 Following Hix et al. (2010), we classify candidates as "safe", "doubtful", and "unpromising" 
based on the candidate’s list position relative to the potential number of seats predicted to be won 
by his or her party. We compute uncertainty about the outcome of the election as the standard 
deviation between the seats won by each party, and the electoral predictions published by Hix et 
al. (2014), based on TNS pre-election surveys. Candidates with a list position below the predicted 
seats minus one standard deviation are classified as “safe”. Candidates with a list position above 
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the predicted seats plus one standard deviation are classified as “unpromising”. All other candidates 
were classified as “doubtful”. In the case of party lists that are not national (all parties in the UK, 
and CDU/CSU in Germany), we divided the predicted seats across districts based on their size 
relative to the total number seats per country.  
14 The only exception is our “morality” classifier, which has low recall (many tweets that are not 
related to morality or democracy are still classified as such). This is perhaps not surprising given 
that this concept has a more complex meaning than the other two variables we consider.  
15 We also find levels of accuracy similar to those reported in other studies that applied machine 
learning methods to the measurement of impoliteness in online settings. For example, Danescu-
Niculescu-Mizil et al. (2013) report a maximum of 84% accuracy in coding of impoliteness in 
conversations on Wikipedia, only slightly below 86% agreement using human coding.  
17 To be clear, we include not only tweets addressed directly to each candidate, but also those that 
mention them in any way, under the assumption that the candidate will receive a notification every 
time their name is mentioned, and can thus read what others are saying about them.  
18 We multiply both variables by 100 to facilitate the interpretation of the regression coefficients.  
19 We find substantively similar results if we estimate fractional logit models, which account for 
the nature of our dependent variables (proportions). However, to facilitate the interpretation of our 
results, here we report coefficients from OLS regressions.  
20 We used estimates provided by Barberá et al (2015), which were computed by applying a method 
similar to latent network modeling to the Twitter networks of individuals who follow each of these 
politicians. In the supplementary material we offer summary statistics for these variables.  
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21 Given the similar results for both variables, in the remaining analyses in this paper we focus on 
impoliteness, which is estimated here with a lower degree of measurement error.  
22 We exclude from the analysis the tweets after the end of the campaign, since as we saw in Figure 
3, they tend to increase in all countries, potentially as a result of factors unrelated to social media 
activity. In splitting the tweets, we take into account the fact that the EP elections in the UK took 
place on May 22nd 2014, but on May 25th 2014 in the other three countries. 
23 Note that we only consider weeks in which the candidate sent at least two tweets, in order to 
reduce measurement error.  
24 Direct responses are recorded as such in the metadata that accompanies each tweet as it is 
captured directly from the Twitter firehose, which allows us to unequivocally determine if a tweet 
is responding to another tweet or not. The average tweet by a candidate received 0.20 responses, 
and 90% of tweets receive 0 responses.  
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Figure 1: Validation: Citizens are more likely to respond to engaging tweets by candidates 
 
Figure 2: Impoliteness in responses to individual tweets at estimated probabilities of being 
engaging, by country 
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Table 1: Data coverage per country (included in multivariate analyses) 
 Country Lists Candidates  Total Tweets 
(including public) 
Mean engaging tweets  
(candidates) 
Mean impolite 
tweets (public) 
Germany 10 92 80901 26%  6%  
Greece 9 79 15057 19%  18%  
Spain 12 211 447357 45%  4%  
UK 28 271 251421 53%  5%  
 
 
Table 2:  OLS regressions of impolite tweets (Models 1–4) or uncivil tweets (Model 5) received on 
engaging tweets sent 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 4.56*** 4.54*** 15.38*** 5.17*** 0.41 
 (1.02) (1.34) (4.11) (1.62) (0.25) 
% Engaging tweets sent 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03** 0.02 0.01*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) 
Greece (dummy) 12.70*** 12.74*** 15.42*** 12.58*** 0.29 
 (1.34) (1.34) (1.52) (1.96) (0.28) 
Spain (dummy) -2.84** -3.20*** -3.21** -4.74** -0.22 
 (1.13) (1.14) (1.31) (1.91) (0.25) 
UK (dummy) -1.55 -1.72 -2.79* -2.65 -0.21 
 (1.15) (1.16) (1.46) (2.01) (0.24) 
Candidate is incumbent  0.13 -0.20 0.15 -0.07 
  (0.49) (0.51) (0.49) (0.07) 
Viability: Safe  -0.13 -0.05 -0.13 0.05 
  (0.55) (0.53) (0.56) (0.08) 
Viability: Unpromising  0.07 0.01 0.10 -0.03 
  (0.38) (0.36) (0.38) (0.06) 
Candidate is male  -0.30 -0.28 -0.31 -0.07* 
  (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.04) 
log(count of followers)  0.14 0.22* 0.15* -0.01 
  (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.01) 
Vote share (national)  -5.37 -2.09 -5.40 -0.95 
  (3.96) (4.48) (4.03) (0.86) 
Prime minister (national)  0.08 0.00 0.07 0.07 
  (1.38) (1.44) (1.40) (0.26) 
LR position   -0.60**   
   (0.25)   
EU position   -1.35**   
   (0.59)   
Engaging x Greece    0.00  
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    (0.05)  
Engaging x Spain    0.04  
    (0.04)  
Engaging x UK    0.03  
    (0.04)  
Num. obs.: candidates 600 600 455 600 600 
Num. groups: parties 58 58 48 58 58 
Var: party (Intercept) 3.84 3.76 4.96 3.92 0.22 
Var: Residual 1783.59 1784.89 1447.82 1786.86 39.17 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
Table 3: OLS regressions of impolite tweets received on engaging tweets sent, with candidate fixed 
effects. 
 All UK Spain Germany Greece 
% Engaging tweets 
sent (lagged) 
0.28** 0.07 0.35 0.43* 0.41 
(0.14) (0.05) (0.36) (0.22) (0.30) 
Intercept -0.12** -0.05* -0.15 -0.09* -0.06 
(0.06) (0.03) (0.15) (0.05) (0.05) 
N (candidates) 505 212 187 64 42 
N (observations) 907 339 370 123 75 
R
2
 
0.10 0.03 0.13 0.23 0.06 
 
Dependent variable: Change in proportion of engaging tweets sent, by week. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sig.: *10% **5% ***1%. 
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Table 4: Multilevel linear regressions of impolite responses on engaging tweets, at individual  tweet level 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.55** -0.65 -0.64 -0.87* 
 (0.22) (0.43) (0.61) (0.44) 
Prob. tweet is engaging 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Greece (dummy) 1.82*** 1.86*** 3.07*** 1.84*** 
 (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) (0.35) 
Spain (dummy) -0.64** -0.77*** -0.99*** -0.30 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.23) (0.30) 
UK (dummy) -0.16 -0.14 -0.86*** 0.04 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.27) (0.29) 
Candidate is incumbent  0.08 0.14 0.08 
  (0.31) (0.24) (0.31) 
log(count of followers)  0.17*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Candidate is male  0.15 0.08 0.15 
  (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) 
Prime minister (national)  0.15 0.07 0.15 
  (0.30) (0.25) (0.30) 
Viability: Safe  -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
Viability: Unpromising  -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) 
Vote share (national)  -1.08 -1.02 -1.12 
  (0.89) (0.68) (0.89) 
LR position   0.04  
   (0.06)  
EU position   -0.45***  
   (0.14)  
Engaging x Greece    0.00 
    (0.01) 
Engaging x Spain    -0.01*** 
    (0.00) 
Engaging x UK    -0.01 
    (0.00) 
Num. obs.: tweets 134330 134330 120798 134330 
Num. groups: candidates 612 612 451 612 
Num. groups: parties 59 59 48 59 
Var: candidates (Intercept) 3.05 2.96 3.61 2.91 
Var: candidates (Engaging tweet) 5.02 4.98 5.92 4.38 
Cov: candidates (Intercept, Engaging tweet) -2.41 -2.34 -3.45 -2.10 
Var: party (Intercept) 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.09 
Var: Residual 17.01 17.01 16.33 17.02 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
